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Abstract
Image manipulation detection is different from tradi-
tional semantic object detection because it pays more at-
tention to tampering artifacts than to image content, which
suggests that richer features need to be learned. We pro-
pose a two-stream Faster R-CNN network and train it end-
to-end to detect the tampered regions given a manipulated
image. One of the two streams is an RGB stream whose pur-
pose is to extract features from the RGB image input to find
tampering artifacts like strong contrast difference, unnatu-
ral tampered boundaries, and so on. The other is a noise
stream that leverages the noise features extracted from a
steganalysis rich model filter layer to discover the noise in-
consistency between authentic and tampered regions. We
then fuse features from the two streams through a bilinear
pooling layer to further incorporate spatial co-occurrence
of these two modalities. Experiments on four standard im-
age manipulation datasets demonstrate that our two-stream
framework outperforms each individual stream, and also
achieves state-of-the-art performance compared to alterna-
tive methods with robustness to resizing and compression.
1. Introduction
With the advances of image editing techniques and user-
friendly editing software, low-cost tampered or manipulated
image generation processes have become widely available.
Among tampering techniques, splicing, copy-move, and re-
moval are the most common manipulations. Image splicing
copies regions from an authentic image and pastes them to
other images, copy-move copies and pastes regions within
the same image, and removal eliminates regions from an
authentic image followed by inpainting. Sometimes, post-
processing like Gaussian smoothing will be applied after
these tampering techniques. Examples of these manipula-
tions are shown in Figure 1. Even with careful inspection,
humans find it difficult to recognize the tampered regions.
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Figure 1. Examples of tampered images that have undergone dif-
ferent tampering techniques. From the top to bottom are the exam-
ples showing manipulations of splicing, copy-move and removal.
As a result, distinguishing authentic images from tam-
pered images has become increasingly challenging. The
emerging research focusing on this topic — image foren-
sics — is of great importance because it seeks to prevent at-
tackers from using their tampered images for unscrupulous
business or political purposes. In contrast to current object
detection networks [28, 18, 10, 32, 16, 31] which aim to de-
tect all objects of different categories in an image, a network
for image manipulation detection would aim to detect only
the tampered regions (usually objects). We investigate how
to adopt object detection networks to perform image manip-
ulation detection by exploring both RGB image content and
image noise features.
Recent work on image forensics utilizes clues such as lo-
cal noise features [35, 26] and Camera Filter Array (CFA)
patterns [19] to classify a specific patch or pixel [11] in an
image as tampered or not, and localize the tampered regions
[19, 9, 6]. Most of these methods focus on a single tamper-
ing technique. A recently proposed architecture [2] based
on a Long Short Term Network (LSTM) segments tampered
patches, showing robustness to multiple tampering tech-
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Figure 2. Illustration of our two-stream Faster R-CNN network. The RGB stream models visual tampering artifacts, such as unusually
high contrast along object edges, and regresses bounding boxes to the ground-truth. The noise stream first obtains the noise feature map
by passing input RGB image through an SRM filter layer, and leverages the noise features to provide additional evidence for manipulation
classification. The RGB and noise streams share the same region proposals from RPN network which only uses RGB features as input.
The RoI pooling layer selects spatial features from both RGB and noise streams. The predicted bounding boxes (denoted as ‘bbx pred’)
are generated from RGB RoI features. A bilinear pooling [23, 17] layer after RoI pooling enables the network to combine the spatial
co-occurrence features from the two streams. Finally, passing the results through a fully connected layer and a softmax layer, the network
produces the predicted label (denoted as ‘cls pred’) and determines whether predicted regions have been manipulated or not.
niques by learning to detect tampered edges. Here, we pro-
pose a novel two-stream manipulation detection framework,
which not only models visual tampering artifacts (e.g., tam-
pered artifacts near manipulated edges), but also captures
inconsistencies in local noise features.
More specifically, we adopt Faster R-CNN [28] within
a two-stream network and perform end-to-end training. A
summary of our method is shown in Figure 2. Deep learn-
ing detection models like Faster R-CNN [28] have demon-
strated good performance on detecting semantic objects
over a range of scales. The Region Proposal Network
(RPN) is the component in Faster R-CNN that is respon-
sible for proposing image regions that are likely to contain
objects of interest, and it can be adapted for image manipu-
lation detection. For distinguishing tampered regions from
authentic regions, we utilize features from the RGB chan-
nels to capture clues like visual inconsistencies at tampered
boundaries and contrast effect between tampered regions
and authentic regions. The second stream analyzes the local
noise features in an image.
The intuition behind the second stream is that when an
object is removed from one image (the source) and pasted
into another (the target), the noise features between the
source and target images are unlikely to match. These dif-
ferences can be partially masked if the user subsequently
compresses the tampered image [26, 4]. To utilize these
features, we transform the RGB image into the noise do-
main and use the local noise features as the input to the sec-
ond stream. There are many ways to produce noise features
from an image. Based on recent work on steganalysis rich
model (SRM) for manipulation classification [35, 15], we
select SRM filter kernels to produce the noise features and
use them as the input channel to the second Faster R-CNN
network.
Features from these two streams are then bi-linearly
pooled for each Region of Interest (RoI) to detect tampering
artifacts based on features from both streams, see Figure 2.
Previous image manipulation datasets [25, 1, 12, 30]
contain only several hundred images, not enough to train
a deep network. To overcome this, we created a synthetic
tampering dataset based on COCO [22] for pre-training our
model and then finetuned the model on different datasets
for testing. Experimental results of our approach on four
standard datasets demonstrate promising performance.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we show how a Faster
R-CNN framework can be adapted for image manipulation
detection in a two-stream fashion. We explore two modal-
ities, RGB tampering artifacts and local noise feature in-
consistencies, bilinearly pooling them to identify tampered
regions. Second, we show that the two streams are comple-
mentary for detecting different tampered techniques, lead-
ing to improved performance on four image manipulation
datasets compared to state-of-the-art methods.
2. Related Work
Research on image forensics consists of various ap-
proaches to detect the low-level tampering artifacts within
a tampered image, including double JPEG compression [4],
CFA color array anaylsis [19] and local noise analysis [7].
Specifically, Bianchi et al. [4] propose a probabilistic model
to estimate the DCT coefficients and quantization factors
for different regions. CFA based methods analyze low-
level statistics introduced by the camera internal filter pat-
terns under the assumption that the tampered regions disturb
these patterns. Goljan et al. [19] propose a Gaussian Mix-
ture Model (GMM) to classify CFA present regions (authen-
tic regions) and CFA absent regions (tampered regions).
Recently, local noise features based methods, like the
steganalysis rich model (SRM) [15], have shown promis-
ing performance in image forensics tasks. These methods
extract local noise features from adjacent pixels, capturing
the inconsistency between tampered regions and authentic
regions. Cozzolino et al. [7] explore and demonstrate the
performance of SRM features in distinguishing tampered
and authentic regions. They also combine SRM features by
including the quantization and truncation operations with a
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to perform manipu-
lation localization [8]. Rao et al. [27] use an SRM filter
kernel as initialization for a CNN to boost the detection ac-
curacy. Most of these methods focus on specific tampering
artifacts and are limited to specific tampering techniques.
We also use these SRM filter kernels to extract low-level
noise that is used as the input to a Faster R-CNN network,
and learn to capture tampering traces from the noise fea-
tures. Moreover, a parallel RGB stream is trained jointly to
model mid- and high-level visual tampering artifacts.
With the success of deep learning techniques in various
computer vision and image processing tasks, a number of
recent techniques have also employed deep learning to ad-
dress image manipulation detection. Chen et al. [5] add a
low pass filter layer before a CNN to detect median filter-
ing tampering techniques. Bayar et al. [3] change the low
pass filter layer to an adaptive kernel layer to learn the fil-
tering kernel used in tampered regions. Beyond filtering
learning, Zhang et al. [34] propose a stacked autoencoder
to learn context features for image manipulation detection.
Cozzolino et al. [9] treat this problem as an anomaly de-
tection task and use an autoencoder based on extracted fea-
tures to distinguish those regions that are difficult to recon-
struct as tampered regions. Salloum et al. [29] use a Fully
Convolutional Network (FCN) framework to directly pre-
dict the tampering mask given an image. They also learn a
boundary mask to guide the FCN to look at tampered edges,
which assists them in achieving better performance in vari-
ous image manipulation datasets. Bappy et al. [2] propose
an LSTM based network applied to small image patches to
find the tampering artifacts on the boundaries between tam-
pered patches and image patches. They jointly train this
network with pixel level segmentation to improve the per-
formance and show results under different tampering tech-
niques. However, only focusing on nearby boundaries pro-
vides limited success in different scenarios, e.g., removing
the whole object might leave no boundary evidence for de-
tection. Instead, we use global visual tampering artifacts
as well as the local noise features to model richer tamper-
ing artifacts. We use a two-stream network built on Faster
R-CNN to learn rich features for image manipulation detec-
tion. The network shows robustness to splicing, copy-move
and removal. In addition, the network enables us to make a
classification of the suspected tampering techniques.
3. Proposed Method
We employ a multi-task framework that simultaneously
performs manipulation classification and bounding box re-
gression. RGB images are provided in the RGB stream (the
top stream in Figure 2), and SRM images in the noise stream
(the bottom stream in Figure 2). We fuse the two streams
through bilinear pooling before a fully connected layer for
manipulation classification. The RPN uses the RGB stream
to localize tampered regions.
3.1. RGB Stream
The RGB stream is a single Faster R-CNN network and
is used both for bounding box regression and manipulation
classification. We use a ResNet 101 network [20] to learn
features from the input RGB image. The output features of
the last convolutional layer of ResNet are used for manipu-
lation classification.
The RPN network in the RGB stream utilizes these fea-
tures to propose RoI for bounding box regression. Formally,
the loss for the RPN network is defined as
LRPN (gi, fi) =
1
Ncls
∑
i
Lcls(gi, g
?
i )
+λ
1
Nreg
∑
i
g?i Lreg(fi, f
?
i ), (1)
where gi denotes the probability of anchor i being a poten-
tial manipulated region in a mini batch, and g?i denotes the
ground-truth label for anchor i to be positive. The terms fi,
f?i are the 4 dimensional bounding box coordinates for an-
chor i and the ground-truth, respectively. Lcls denotes cross
entropy loss for RPN network and Lreg denotes smooth L1
loss for regression for the proposal bounding boxes. Ncls
denotes the size of a mini-batch in the RPN network. Nreg
is the number of anchor locations. The term λ is a hyper-
parameter to balance the two losses and is set to 10. Note
that in contrast to traditional object detection whose RPN
network searches for regions that are likely to be objects,
our RPN network searches for regions that are likely to be
manipulated. The proposed regions might not necessarily
be objects, e.g., the case in the removal tampering process.
3.2. Noise Stream
RGB channels are not sufficient to tackle all the different
cases of manipulation. In particular, tampered images that
were carefully post processed to conceal the splicing bound-
ary and reduce contrast differences are challenging for the
RGB stream.
So, we utilize the local noise distributions of the image to
provide additional evidence. In contrast to the RGB stream,
the noise stream is designed to pay more attention to noise
rather than semantic image content. This is novel — while
current deep learning models do well in representing hier-
archical features from RGB image content, no prior work
in deep learning has investigated learning from noise distri-
butions in detection. Inspired by recent progress on SRM
features from image forensics [15], we use SRM filters to
extract the local noise features (examples shown in Figure
3) from RGB images as the input to our noise stream.
In our setting, noise is modeled by the residual between
a pixel’s value and the estimate of that pixel’s value pro-
duced by interpolating only the values of neighboring pix-
els. Starting from 30 basic filters, along with nonlinear op-
erations like maximum and minimum of the nearby outputs
after filtering, SRM features gather the basic noise features.
SRM quantifies and truncates the output of these filters and
extracts the nearby co-occurrence information as the final
features. The feature obtained from this process can be re-
garded as a local noise descriptor [7]. We find that only us-
ing 3 kernels can achieve decent performance, and applying
all 30 kernels does not give significant performance gain.
Therefore, we choose 3 kernels, whose weights are shown
in Figure 4, and directly feed these into a pre-trained net-
work trained on 3-channel inputs. We define the kernel size
of the SRM filter layer in the noise stream to be 5 × 5 × 3.
The output channel size of our SRM layer is 3.
The resulting noise feature maps after the SRM layer are
shown in the third column of Figure 3. It is clear that they
emphasize the local noise instead of image content and ex-
plicitly reveal tampering artifacts that might not be visible
in the RGB channels. We directly use the noise features as
the input to the noise stream network. The backbone con-
volutional network architecture of the noise stream is the
same as the RGB stream. The noise stream shares the same
RoI pooling layer as the RGB stream. For bounding box
Tampered image Visual artifacts Noise Ground-truth
Figure 3. Illustration of tampering artifacts. Two examples show-
ing tampering artifacts in the original RGB image and in the local
noise features obtained by the SRM filter layer. The second col-
umn is the amplified regions for the red bounding boxes in the first
column. As shown in the second column, the unnaturally high con-
trast along the baseball player’s edges provides a strong cue about
the presence of tampering. The third column shows the local noise
inconsistency between tampered regions and authentic regions. In
different scenarios, visual information and noise features play a
complementary role in revealing tampering artifacts.
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Figure 4. The three SRM filter kernels used to extract noise fea-
tures.
regression, we only use the RGB channels because RGB
features perform better than noise features for the RPN net-
work based on our experiments (See Table 1).
3.3. Bilinear Pooling
We finally combine the RGB stream with the noise
stream for manipulation detection. Among various fusion
methods, we apply bilinear pooling on features from both
streams. Bilinear pooling [23], first proposed for fine-
grained classification, combines streams in a two-stream
CNN network while preserving spatial information to im-
prove the detection confidence. The output of our bilin-
ear pooling layer is x = fTRGBfN , where fRGB is the
RoI feature of the RGB stream and fN is the RoI feature
of the noise stream. Sum pooling squeezes the spatial fea-
ture before classification. We then apply signed square root
(x← sign(x)√|x|) and L2 normalization before forward-
ing to the fully connected layer.
To save memory and speed up training without decreas-
ing performance, we use compact bilinear pooling as pro-
posed in [17].
After the fully connected and softmax layers, we obtain
the predicted class of the RoI regions, as indicated in Figure
2. We use cross entropy loss for manipulation classification
and smooth L1 loss for bounding box regression. The total
loss function is:
Ltotal = LRPN + Ltamper(fRGB , fN ) + Lbbox(fRGB),
(2)
where Ltotal denotes total loss. LRPN denotes the RPN
loss in RPN network. Ltamper denotes the final cross en-
tropy classification loss, which is based on the bilinear pool-
ing feature from both the RGB and noise stream. Lbbox
denotes the final bounding box regression loss. fRGB and
fN are the RoI features from RGB and noise streams. The
summation of all terms produces the total loss function.
3.4. Implementation Detail
The proposed network is trained end-to-end. The input
image as well as the extracted noise features are re-sized
so that the shorter length equals to 600 pixels. Four anchor
scales with size from 82, 162, 322 to 642 are used, and the
aspect ratios are 1:2, 1:1 and 2:1. The feature size after RoI
pooling is 7 × 7 × 1024 for both RGB and noise streams.
The output feature size of compact bilinear pooling is set to
16384. The batch size of RPN proposal is 64 for training
and 300 for testing.
Image flipping is used for data augmentation. The
Intersection-over Union (IoU) threshold for RPN positive
example (potential manipulated regions) is 0.7 and 0.3 for
negative example (authentic regions). Learning rate is ini-
tially set to 0.001 and then is reduced to 0.0001 after 40K
steps. We train our model for 110K steps. At test time, stan-
dard Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS) is applied to re-
duce the redundancy of proposed overlapping regions. The
NMS threshold is set to 0.2.
4. Experiments
We demonstrate our two stream network on four stan-
dard image manipulation datasets and compare the results
with state-of-the-art methods. We also compare differ-
ent data augmentations and measure the robustness of our
method to resizing and JPEG compression.
4.1. Pre-trained Model
Current standard datasets do not have enough data for
deep neural network training. To test our network on these
datasets, we pre-train our model on our synthetic dataset.
We automatically create a synthetic dataset using the images
and annotations from COCO [22]. We use the segmentation
annotations to randomly select objects from COCO [22],
AP Synthetic test
RGB Net 0.445
Noise Net 0.461
RGB-N noise RPN 0.472
Noise + RGB RPN 0.620
RGB-N 0.627
Table 1. AP comparison on our synthetic COCO dataset. The row
is the model architectures, where RGB Net is a single Faster R-
CNN using RGB image as input; Noise Net is a single Faster R-
CNN using noise feature map as input; RGB-N noise RPN is a
two-stream Faster R-CNN using noise features for RPN network.
Noise + RGB RPN is a two-stream Faster R-CNN using both noise
and RGB features as the input of RPN network. RGB-N is a two-
stream Faster R-CNN using RGB features for RPN network.
and then copy and paste them to other images. The training
(90%) and testing set (10%) is split to ensure the same back-
ground and tampered object do not appear in both training
and testing set. Finally, we create 42K tampered and au-
thentic image pairs. We will release this dataset for research
use. The output of our model is bounding boxes with con-
fidence scores indicating whether the detected regions have
been manipulated or not.
To include some authentic regions in Region of Interest
(RoI) for better comparison, We slightly enlarge the default
bounding boxes by 20 pixels during training so that both
the RGB and noise streams learn the inconsistency between
tampered and authentic regions.
We train our model end-to-end on this synthetic dataset.
The ResNet 101 used in Faster R-CNN is pre-trained on Im-
ageNet. We use Average Precision (AP) for evaluation, the
metric of which is the same as COCO [22] detection eval-
uation. We compare the result of the two-stream network
with each one of the streams in Table 1. This table shows
that our two-stream network performs better than each sin-
gle stream. Also, the comparison among RGB-N, RGB-N
using noise features as RPN and RPN uses both features
shows that RGB features are more suitable than noise fea-
tures to generate region proposals.
4.2. Testing on Standard Datasets
Datasets. We compare our method with current state-of-
the-art methods on NIST Nimble 2016 [1] (NIST16), CA-
SIA [12, 13], COVER [30] and Columbia dataset.
• NIST16 is a challenging dataset which contains all three
tampering techniques. The manipulations in this dataset are
post-processed to conceal visible traces. They also provide
ground-truth tampering mask for evaluation.
• CASIA provides spliced and copy-moved images of var-
ious objects. The tampered regions are carefully selected
and some post processing like filtering and blurring is also
applied. Ground-truth masks are obtained by thresholding
Datasets NIST16 CASIA Columbia COVER
Training 404 5123 - 75
Testing 160 921 180 25
Table 2. Training and testing split (number of images) for four
standard datasets. Columbia is only used for testing the model
trained on our synthetic dataset.
the difference between tampered and original images. We
use CASIA 2.0 for training and CASIA 1.0 for testing.
• COVER is a relatively small dataset focusing on copy-
move. It covers similar objects as the pasted regions to con-
ceal the tampering artifacts (see the second row in Figure
1). Ground-truth masks are provided.
• Columbia dataset focuses on splicing based on uncom-
pressed images. Ground-truth masks are provided.
To fine-tune our model on these datasets, we extract the
bounding box from the ground-truth mask. We compare
with other approaches on the same training and testing split
protocol as [2] (for NIST16 and COVER) and [29] (for
Columbia and CASIA). See Table 2.
Evaluation Metric. We use pixel level F1 score and Area
Under the receiver operating characteristic Curve (AUC)
as our evaluation metrics for performance comparison. F1
score is a pixel level evaluation metric for image manipula-
tion detection, as discussed in [33, 29]. We vary different
thresholds and use the highest F1 score as the final score
for each image, which follows the same protocol in [33, 29].
We assign the confidence score to every pixel in the detected
bounding boxes for pixel-level AUC evaluation.
Baseline Models. We compare our proposed method with
various baseline models as described below:
• ELA: An error level analysis method [21] which aims to
find the compression error difference between tampered re-
gions and authentic regions through different JPEG com-
pression qualities.
• NOI1: A noise inconsistency based method using high
pass wavelet coefficients to model local noise [24].
• CFA1:A CFA pattern estimation method [14] which uses
nearby pixels to approximate the camera filter array patterns
and then produces the tampering probability for each pixel.
•MFCN: A multi-task edge-enhanced FCN based network
[29] jointly detecting tampered edges using edge binary
masks and tampered regions using tampered region masks.
• J-LSTM: An LSTM based network [2] jointly training
patch level tampered edge classification and pixel level tam-
pered region segmentation.
• RGB Net: A single Faster R-CNN network with RGB
images as input. i.e., our RGB Faster R-CNN stream.
• Noise Net: A single Faster R-CNN network with noise
feature map as input obtained from a SRM filter layer. The
RPN network uses noise features in this case.
• Late Fusion: Direct fusion combining all detected bound-
ing boxes for both RGB Net and noise Net. The confi-
NIST16 Columbia COVER CASIA
ELA [21] 0.236 0.470 0.222 0.214
NOI1 [24] 0.285 0.574 0.269 0.263
CFA1 [14] 0.174 0.467 0.190 0.207
MFCN [29] 0.571 0.612 - 0.541
RGB Net 0.567 0.585 0.391 0.392
Noise Net 0.521 0.705 0.355 0.283
Late Fusion 0.625 0.681 0.371 0.397
RGB-N (ours) 0.722 0.697 0.437 0.408
Table 3. F1 score comparison on four standard datasets. ‘-’ de-
notes that the result is not available in the literature.
NIST16 Columbia COVER CASIA
ELA [21] 0.429 0.581 0.583 0.613
NOI1 [24] 0.487 0.546 0.587 0.612
CFA1 [14] 0.501 0.720 0.485 0.522
J-LSTM [2] 0.764 - 0.614 -
RGB Net 0.857 0.796 0.789 0.768
Noise Net 0.881 0.851 0.753 0.693
Late Fusion 0.924 0.856 0.793 0.777
RGB-N (ours) 0.937 0.858 0.817 0.795
Table 4. Pixel level AUC comparison on four standard datasets. ‘-’
denotes that the result is not available in the literature.
dence scores of the overlapping detected regions from the
two streams are set to the maximum one.
•RGB-N: Bilinear pooling of RGB stream and noise stream
for manipulation classification and RGB stream for bound-
ing box regression. i.e. our full model.
We use the F1 scores of NOI1, CFA1 and ELA reported
in [29] and run the code provided by [33] to obtain the AUC
results. The results of MFCN and J-LSTM are replicated
from the original literatures as their code is not publicly
available.
Table 3 shows the F1 score comparison between our
method and the baselines. Table 4 provides the AUC com-
parison. From these two tables, it is clear that our method
outperforms conventional methods like ELA, NOI1 and
CFA1. This is because they all focus on specific tampering
artifacts that only contain partial information for localiza-
tion, which limits their performance. Our approach outper-
forms MFCN on Columbia and NIST16 dataset.
One of the reasons our method achieves better perfor-
mance than J-LSTM is that J-LSTM seeks tampered edges
as evidence of tampering, which cannot always detect the
entire tampered regions. Also, our method has larger re-
ceptive field and captures global context rather than nearby
pixels, which helps collect more cues like contrast differ-
ence for manipulation classification.
As shown in Table 3 and 4, our RGB-N network also
improves the individual streams for all the datasets except
Columbia. Columbia only contains uncompressed spliced
regions, which preserves noise differences so well that it is
Tampered image Ground-truth RGB Net result Noise Net result RGB-N result
Figure 5. Qualitative visualization of results. The top row shows a qualitative result from the COVER dataset. The copy-moved bag
confuses the RGB Net, and the noise Net. RGB-N achieves a better detection in this case because it combines the features from the two
streams. The middle row shows a qualitative result from the Columbia. The RGB Net produces a more accurate result than noise stream.
Taking into account both streams produces a better result for RGB-N. The bottom row shows a qualitative result from the CASIA1.0. The
spliced object leaves clear tampering artifacts in both the RGB and noise streams, which yields precise detections for the RGB, noise, and
RGB-N networks.
Authentic image Tampered image Noise map Ground-truth Detection result
Figure 6. Qualitative results for multi-class image manipulation detection on NIST16 dataset. RGB and noise map provide different
information for splicing, copy-move and removal. By combining the features from the RGB image with the noise features, RGB-N
produces the correct classification for different tamepring techniques.
F1/AUC NIST16 COVER CASIA
Flipping + JPEG 0.712/0.950 0.425/0.810 0.413/0.785
Flipping + noise 0.717/0.947 0.412/0.801 0.396/0.776
Flipping 0.722/0.937 0.437/0.817 0.408/0.795
No flipping 0.716/0.940 0.312/0.793 0.361/0.766
Table 5. Data augmentation comparison. Flipping: image flipping.
JPEG: JPEG compression with quality 70. Noise: adding Gaus-
sian noise with variance of 5. Each entry is F1/AUC score.
JPEG/Resizing 100/1 70/0.7 50/0.5
NOI1 0.285/0.285 0.142/0.147 0.140/0.155
ELA 0.236/0.236 0.119/0.141 0.114/0.114
CFA1 0.174/0.174 0.152/0.134 0.139/0.141
RGB-N 0.722/0.722 0.677/0.689 0.677/0.681
Table 6. F1 score on NIST16 dataset for JPEG compression (with
quality 70 and 50) and resizing (with scale 0.7 and 0.5) attacks.
Each entry is the F1 score of JPEG/Resizing.
Splicing Removal Copy-Move Mean
AP 0.960 0.939 0.903 0.934
Table 7. AP comparison on multi-class on NIST16 dataset using
the RGB-N network. Mean denotes the mean AP for splicing,
removal and copy-move.
sufficient to use only the noise features. This yields satis-
factory performance for the noise stream.
For all datasets, late fusion performs worse than RGB-N,
which shows the effectiveness of our fusion approach.
Data Augmentation. We compare different data augmen-
tation methods in Table 5. Compared with no augmenta-
tion, image flipping improves the performance and other
augmentation methods like JPEG compression and noise
contribute little improvement.
Robustness to JPEG and Resizing Attacks. We test the
robustness of our method and compare with 3 methods
(whose code is available) in Table 6. Our method is more
robust to these attacks and outperforms other methods.
4.3. Manipulation Technique Detection
The rich feature representation of our network enables
it to distinguish between different manipulation techniques
as well. We explore manipulation technique detection and
analyze the detection performance for all three tampering
techniques. NIST16 contains the labels for all three tam-
pering techniques, which enables multi-class image manip-
ulation detection. We change the classes for manipulation
classification to be splicing, removal and copy-move so as
to learn distinct visual tampering artifacts and noise features
for each class. The performance of each tamper class is
shown in Table 7.
The AP result in Table 7 indicates that splicing is the
easiest manipulation techniques to detect using our method.
This is because splicing has a high probability to produce
both RGB artifacts like unnatural edges, contrast differ-
ences as well as noise artifacts. Removal detection per-
formance also beats copy-move because the inpainting that
follows the removal process has a large effect on the noise
features, as shown in Figure 3. Copy-move is the most dif-
ficult tamper technique for our proposed method. The ex-
planation is that on one hand, the copied regions are from
the same image, which yields a similar noise distribution to
confuse our noise stream. On the other hand, the two re-
gions generally have the same contrast. Also, the technique
would ideally need to compare the two objects to each other
(i.e., it would need to find and compare two RoIs at the same
time), which the current approach does not do. Thus, our
RGB stream has less evidence to distinguish between the
two regions.
4.4. Qualitative Result
We show some qualitative results in Figure 5 for compar-
ison of RGB, noise and RGB-N network in two-class image
manipulation detection. The images are selected from the
COVER, Columbia and CASIA 1.0. Figure 5 provides ex-
amples for which our two-stream network yields good per-
formance even if one of the single streams fails (the first and
second row in Figure 5).
Figure 6 shows the results of the RGB-N network on
the task of manipulation technique detection task using the
NIST16. As is shown in the figure, our network produces
accurate results for different tampering techniques.
5. Conclusion
We propose a novel network using both an RGB stream
and a noise stream to learn rich features for image manipu-
lation detection. We extract noise features by an SRM filter
layer adapted from steganalysis literatures, which enables
our model to capture noise inconsistency between tampered
and authentic regions. We explore the complementary con-
tribution of finding tampered regions from RGB and the
noise features of an image. Not surprisingly, the fusion
of the two streams leads to improved performance. Ex-
periments on standard datasets show that our method not
only detects tampering artifacts but also distinguishes be-
tween various tampering techniques. More features, includ-
ing JPEG compression, will be explored in the future.
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